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This study examines the link between product market
competition and labour investment efficiency. We find
that competitive pressure distorts the efficiency of
corporate employment decisions by creating an un-
derinvestment problem. This finding withstands a
battery of robustness checks and remains unchanged
after accounting for endogeneity concerns. Additional
analysis shows that the relationship between product
market competition and labour investment efficiency is
stronger for firms facing higher competitive threats,
greater financial constraints, higher information
asymmetry and higher labour adjustment costs.
Our results suggest that as competition increases
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bankruptcy risk, it leads managers to underinvest in
labour to avoid incurring labour‐related costs.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Understanding the determinants of corporate investment decisions has long been a central
issue in corporate finance research. Since the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller
(1958), an important stream of literature has shown that, under less restrictive capital
market assumptions, firm real investment is relevant and is affected by various factors; see
Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) for comprehensive literature reviews. Recently, a growing
number of studies highlight the role of product market characteristics in shaping firm
investment policies and asset returns (e.g., Aguerrevere, 2009; Gu, 2016; Stoughton et al.,
2017). Following substantial changes in the U.S. competitive landscape,1 some research
focuses on how product market competition influences corporate investment. However,
most of this literature examines firm investments in capital expenditure, research and
development (R&D) and innovation (e.g., Akdoğu & MacKay, 2012; Frésard & Valta, 2016;
Jiang et al., 2015). There is surprisingly little work on the effects of competition on firm
investment in labour, an equally important factor of production. Indeed, labour‐related
costs exceed two‐thirds of the economy‐wide value added (Jung et al., 2014) and represent a
significant portion of total production costs. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau's Annual
Survey of Manufacturers shows that payroll and employee benefits in the manufacturing
sector amounted to about $840 billion in 2017, relative to $169 billion in capital ex-
penditures.2 More importantly, human capital is considered an asset vital to firms, parti-
cularly to those operating in competitive and rapidly changing environments. Zingales
(2000, p. 1642) remarks that ‘[…] increased competition at the worldwide level has increased
the demand for process innovation and quality improvement, which can only be generated
by talented employees’.
The present paper addresses this void in the literature by investigating the implications
of product market competition for labour investment efficiency. The rationale behind our
research question is twofold. First, although recent studies highlight the prominent role
of product market competition in shaping firm R&D and capital investment decisions,
the results and conclusions of such studies cannot be used to infer the impact on labour
investment decisions. This is because capital and labour investments differ with respect
to their adjustment costs, which represent an important driver of firm investment
1Many factors have contributed to changes in the U.S. competitive environment, including antitrust laws, deregulatory
initiatives, import competition and economic globalization (e.g., Bloom et al., 2016; Irvine & Pontiff, 2009).




strategies.3 Accordingly, the greater the difference between labour adjustment costs (LACs)
and capital adjustment costs (CACs), the greater the difference in the impact of competition
on labour and capital investment.4 In addition, labour markets are highly regulated and
strongly coordinated, making it costly for companies to undertake employment adjustments
(Matsa, 2018). For example, many U.S. states have passed minimum wage laws and em-
ployment protection regulations, increasing the costs of hiring and retaining employees.
Second, labour investment presents unique characteristics that make it more subject to
market frictions, leading to more inefficient behaviour. As an intangible asset, labour invest-
ment is hard to monitor as it often falls within the discretion of managers. Accordingly, it is
characterized by more managerial private information than capital investment,5 making it
easier for managers to deviate from the optimal level of investment to the detriment of
shareholder interests. To the extent that investment in labour requires high input costs, such as
wages, costs of hiring, training, retaining and firing (e.g., Dube et al., 2010), managers may be
reluctant to engage in costly labour‐related activity, creating a potential underinvestment
problem in labour. These arguments underscore the unique characteristics of labour and the
importance of extending the literature by considering the impact of competition on firm em-
ployment decisions.
We develop and examine two competing views on the relation between product market
competition and labour investment efficiency. The first view, known as the ‘bright side’ of
product market competition, suggests that competitive pressure improves labour investment
efficiency. The argument behind this conjecture is that competition acts as an effective tool to
discipline managers and alleviate the divergence of interests between managers and share-
holders (e.g., Hart, 1983; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983; Schmidt, 1997). According to agency theory,
such a divergence of interests is considered the major cause of inefficient management beha-
viour, which can take the form of empire‐building through overinvestment or effort aversion
through underinvestment (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Specifically, firm
overinvestment in labour is reflected in either overhiring by expanding the number of staff
beyond its optimal level or underfiring by retaining an unproductive workforce (e.g., Ghaly
et al., 2020). Underinvestment in labour can also be caused by manager preference for the
‘quiet life’ and reluctance to expand investment in labour (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003),
which results in an underhiring or overfiring problem. On the basis of the disciplinary effect of
competition, we expect firms facing stiffer competitive pressures to undertake more efficient
labour investment.
In contrast, the alternative view suggests that competitive pressure in the product market is
negatively associated with labour investment efficiency due to the ‘dark side’ of competition.
This view predicts that firms facing greater product market competition may either underinvest
or overinvest in labour, following two different mechanisms. First, to the extent that compe-
tition impinges on a firm's expected profits (e.g., Tirole, 2010) and exposes the firm to risk of
3The literature on investment dynamics shows that corporate investments respond slowly to shocks, such as un-
certainty shocks, due to factor adjustment costs. However, LACs appear to be substantially lower than CACs (e.g.,
Bloom, 2009; Shapiro, 1986).
4In additional analysis (see our online Supporting Information Appendix and Table S5), we provide empirical support
for the argument that the difference between LACs and CACs leads to a more pronounced effect of competition on
labour investment.
5Rampini and Viswanathan (2013) further explain that investment decisions in physical assets suffer less from agency
and information asymmetry problems, due to the availability of more detailed information about such assets, which
makes it harder for managers to hide opportunistic behaviour.
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predation (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990), it increases the firm's liquidation and default risk
(Schmidt, 1997; Valta, 2012) as well as managerial concerns about short‐term performance
(Stein, 1988). Such unfavourable circumstances might exacerbate myopic managerial beha-
viour, incentivizing risk‐averse managers to engage in short‐term actions to avoid depressing
short‐term earnings. Indeed, several studies show that, due to increased risk arising from
competitive pressure, firms face higher costs of bank debt (Valta, 2012) and resort to con-
servative financial policies (MacKay & Phillips, 2005; Hoberg et al., 2014; Xu, 2012). In the
same vein, Porter (1992) argues that managers may also respond to the risk‐increasing effect of
competition by delaying investment projects whose costs can distort current performance. This
argument suggests that companies facing intense competition tend to reduce investment in
labour (i.e., by overfiring or underhiring), as labour investment requires high input costs that
could significantly depress short‐term earnings.
Instead of reducing investment in labour, managers may respond to competitive pressure by
overinvesting in labour, for two main reasons. First, due to competitive threats from rivals,
managers may have incentives to demonstrate a strong commitment to fair treatment of sta-
keholders, which enhances their reputation in the debt market and enables them to raise funds
at better terms. Managers can accomplish this by overhiring employees, a key stakeholder and
improving their welfare, for example, through underfiring employees and increasing their job
security, satisfaction and motivation. On the contrary, competitive pressure may induce myopic
managers to protect their private benefits in the short run by engaging in unethical behaviour,
such as earnings management and tax avoidance (e.g., Gokalp et al., 2017; Lee & Liu, 2016;
Wang & Winton, 2012). Another tool by which managers may engage in such activity is to
overinvest in labour, as this would allow them to collude with employees to extract private
benefits (e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003; Pagano & Volpin, 2005). In sum, we hypothesize
that, due to the risk‐increasing effect of competition and its implications for managerial in-
centives, product market competitive pressure decreases labour investment efficiency by
creating both underinvestment and overinvestment incentives.
To test these competing hypotheses, we use a recently proposed proxy for product market
competition, product market fluidity (FLUIDITY). Developed by Hoberg et al. (2014),
FLUIDITY is a text‐based measure of competitive threats that reflects the similarity between a
firm's products and overall change in rivals’ products. As for our main dependent variable, we
follow recent studies (e.g., Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014) and create an inverse
measure of labour investment efficiency, abnormal net hiring (|AB_NET_HIRE|). This variable
is defined as the absolute deviation of actual net hiring from its optimal level. As in prior
research (e.g., Benmelech et al., 2011; Ellul et al., 2018), we measure actual net hiring as
percentage change in the number of employees. The optimal level of net hiring is then esti-
mated using a model that explains the change in a firm's labour force as a function of an
extensive list of underlying economic fundamentals. Simply put, |AB_NET_HIRE| reflects the
amount of labour investment that is not predicted by the economic fundamentals in a model of
optimal labour demand. Our estimation approach builds on the literature on capital investment
(e.g., Biddle et al., 2009; Richardson, 2006) and labour investment (e.g., Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer,
2016; Khedmati et al., 2019). Specifically, we follow the latter strand of research and use the
comprehensive labour demand model of Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) to estimate optimal net
hiring. As a sensitivity analysis, we consider alternative definitions of optimal labour invest-





Using U.S. data over the period 1998−2017, our empirical analysis shows strong evidence
that product market competition negatively influences firms’ labour investment efficiency. The
market competition effect is not only statistically significant, but also economically important.
An increase in the intensity of competition (FLUIDITY) from the first to third quartiles is
associated with an increase in the deviation of actual net hiring from its optimal level by about
8%. This finding is consistent with our alternative hypothesis and the ‘dark side’ view of
competition. We also provide evidence on the specific forms of efficiency in labour investment
that product market competition is likely to distort. Consistent with our prediction, we find that
product market competition exacerbates underinvestment problems, particularly underhiring
and overfiring.
A major concern in our study is the possibility that the relation between product market
competition and labour investment efficiency could be driven by endogeneity arising from
omitted variables or reverse causality. We take great care to address this concern by (1) ap-
plying the propensity score matching (PSM) technique to ensure that our findings are not
driven by confounding effects due to observable covariates and (2) rerunning our analysis in a
quasi‐natural experimental setting, using large import tariff reductions as an exogenous source
of variation in competitive pressure. As suggested by Frésard (2010), softening of trade barriers
and reduced tariff rates facilitate penetration by foreign rivals, triggering intensified foreign
competitive pressure on firms. To exploit this exogenous shock, we use U.S. trade data for the
manufacturing sector and identify large reductions in tariff rates as trade liberalization events.
The results from this analysis are consistent with our main inference. In further analysis, we
alleviate omitted‐variable bias by introducing additional control variables. We also provide
evidence of a direct association between competition and labour investment efficiency by
showing that our results are not simply driven by other nonlabour investments, such as R&D
and capital investment.
We next investigate how the relation between product market competition and labour
investment efficiency varies in the cross‐section of the sample firms. To the extent that the risk‐
increasing effect of competition prompts managers to reduce investment, this effect should
vary, depending on the degree of competitive pressure, financing constraints, information
asymmetry and labour‐related costs faced by firms. In the first set of cross‐sectional tests, we
investigate the role of firm exposure to competitive threats. We conjecture that greater exposure
to competitive pressure increases firms’ inability to cope with external competitive threats,
which, in turn, exacerbates the risk‐increasing effect of product market competition (S. Li &
Zhan, 2019; Valta, 2012). Consistent with this prediction, our results show that labour in-
vestment reacts more strongly to competition for firms with weaker market share, as such firms
are less able to fight off competitive threats. We find similar patterns for undiversified firms,
which have less ability to spread risk across multiple segments and, thus, are less protected
from competitive pressure.
In further cross‐sectional analysis, we examine the impact of product market competition
on labour investment efficiency, conditional on the severity of financial constraints. Financial
constraints are a major impediment to investment and growth, as they limit firm access to
external financing and expose firms to aggressive competitive strategies adopted by financially
stronger rivals (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; Campello, 2006). Therefore, we expect product
market competition to play a more important role in discouraging firm investment in labour
under binding financial constraints. Using conventional measures of financial constraint, we
find that the relation between product market competition and labour investment efficiency is
more pronounced for more financially constrained firms, consistent with our expectation.
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Next, we investigate the role of information asymmetry in shaping the relation between
product market competition and labour investment efficiency. Information asymmetry is likely
to make it costlier for firms to obtain external financing, thus limiting their ability to fight
competition and imposing a greater competitive risk on them. Accordingly, one would expect
asymmetric information to increase firm sensitivity to the risk‐increasing effect of product
market competition, which is likely to distort labour investment efficiency. Using several
proxies for information asymmetry, we find consistent evidence that intensified competition
exacerbates abnormal net hiring in firms facing more severe information asymmetry problems.
Our fourth cross‐sectional test exploits the fact that firms face varying LACs, which affect
their ability to maintain labour investment efficiency. Specifically, we examine whether the
effect of product market competition on abnormal net hiring is more pronounced for firms with
higher LACs. We find that the negative impact of competition on labour investment efficiency
is indeed stronger for firms with greater dependence on skilled labour and firms in highly
un‐ionized industries, that is, those facing high LACs. Taken together, our analyses provide
corroborating evidence that the relation between product market competition and labour
investment efficiency, particularly underinvestment, arises from the risk‐increasing effect of
competition, as this relation is more pronounced among firms facing greater competitive
pressure, tighter financing constraints, severe information asymmetries and higher LACs.
Finally, we shed light on the issue of whether the documented impact of competition on
labour investment can be directly inferred from existing work on the relation between com-
petition and nonlabour investment (capital investment). We specifically examine whether the
differences between LACs and CACs can impact the relation between competition and labour
investment efficiency. Our results are consistent with the notion that the risk‐increasing effect
of competition is not homogeneous across all types of investment and that it is particularly
pronounced for investment types that have higher adjustment costs. These findings further
highlight the necessity of extending the literature on the link between competition and capital
investment to labour investment.
This study contributes to the literature in several respects. First, we add to research on
product market competition by demonstrating the important role of this industry‐level factor in
shaping firm investment in human capital. The literature shows that competitive pressure can
influence myriad corporate decisions and outcomes, including disclosure (X. Li, 2010; Lin &
Wei, 2014), earnings management (Datta et al., 2013; Markarian & Santalo, 2014), capital
structure and cash holdings (Chi & Su, 2016; Lyandres & Palazzo, 2016; Xu, 2012), investment
in capital expenditure, R&D, innovation and corporate social responsibility (Akdoğu &
MacKay, 2012; Flammer, 2015; Frésard & Valta, 2016; Jiang et al., 2015), firm performance and
productivity (Dasgupta et al., 2018) and stock price crash risk (S. Li & Zhan, 2019). This paper
shares a focus similar to studies that analyze the effect of competition on investment decisions.
Nevertheless, we extend this line of research by documenting novel evidence of the impact of
product market competition on labour investment decisions.
This study also informs an interesting and ongoing debate in the literature on the pros and
cons of product market competition. Our finding that competitive threats distort labour in-
vestment efficiency provides empirical support for the ‘dark side’ view of competition.
Indirectly, our evidence is consistent with the view that competition increases firm default risk
and exposes firms to predation from rivals (Valta, 2012), which could, in turn, fundamentally
affect their operating decisions (e.g., Akdoğu & MacKay, 2012; Frésard & Valta, 2016). We




pressure also has implications for labour investment decisions, over and above those for
nonlabour investments.
Finally, we add to a growing strand of literature on the determinants of labour investment
behaviour, much of which focuses on determining factors at the firm, investor and executive
levels, including firm financial constraints (Benmelech et al., 2011), financial reporting quality
(Jung et al., 2014), stock price informativeness (Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer, 2016), ownership
structure (Hall, 2016), political connections (Faccio & Hsu, 2017), CEO–director ties (Khedmati
et al., 2019) and institutional investors (Ghaly et al., 2020). In focusing on the factors that
influence labour decisions, prior research pays less attention to product market characteristics.
We contribute to this stream of research by examining whether and how labour investment is
influenced by an important industry‐level factor, product market competition. To the best of
our knowledge, the present study is the first to explicitly address this issue.
Our findings have important policy implications for practitioners and policymakers seeking
to improve labour investment efficiency, which has become an increasingly prominent issue,
particularly in the face of important recent events. For example, the onset of the COVID‐19
pandemic has significantly affected firm employment decisions. Although this crisis has ne-
gatively affected many industries, it has strongly impacted the small‐ and medium‐sized en-
terprise sector, an important driver of job creation in the U.S., employing nearly 50% of the U.S.
labour force. Indeed, the pandemic has caused a dramatic surge in the unemployment rate,
from 3.6% in January 2020 to 14.7% in April 2020, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labour
Statistics. This situation is very harmful to companies where labour is a crucial factor of
production. Bretscher et al. (2020) document evidence of a strong negative effect of the
COVID‐19 crisis on firm financial performance, particularly in labour‐intensive industries. Our
paper highlights one cause of the downward shift in labour demand, intensification of industry
competitive pressure. Understanding the causes of the shift in labour investment decisions is
important as it enables regulators to design and implement policies to limit the harm from
labour market disruptions. Accordingly, our finding that labour investment efficiency is sig-
nificantly affected by industry dynamics underscores an urgent need for appropriate policies to
focus on human capital when economic crises and other external shocks have an industry‐wide
dimension.
Moreover, this paper provides a timely contribution to the debate on globalization, which
has been gaining increasing attention, particularly due to uncertainty surrounding recent trade
frictions among the United States, European Union, China and several Asia‐Pacific countries
(Charoenwong et al., 2020). Our results show that intensification of competition in U.S. product
markets due to globalization of business activities (e.g., in the form of large reductions in
import tariff rates) reduces labour investment efficiency by creating labour underinvestment.
However, the severity of this underinvestment depends on several factors, including the
vulnerability of companies to competitive threats, the magnitude of their LACs and their
degrees of financial constraint and asymmetric information. In light of increased geopolitical
tension and a potential trend of deglobalization in recent years, it is critically important that
corporate managers make careful labour investment decisions on the basis of all relevant
available information.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the arguments that link product market
competition to labour investment efficiency and develops our testable hypotheses. Section 3
describes the data and defines the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses
the empirical evidence. Section 5 presents the results of robustness tests. Sections 6 and 7 report
additional cross‐sectional test results. Finally, Section 8 sets forth our conclusions.
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2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
2.1 | Bright and dark sides of product market competition
The literature describes both the pros and cons of product market competition. The ‘bright side’
view of competition suggests that competitive pressure can help alleviate agency conflicts arising
from the separation of ownership and control (e.g., Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997).6 To the extent that
product market competition reduces firm profit margins, it compels managers to work more
diligently by avoiding self‐serving activities and opportunistic behaviour, thus aligning their in-
terests with those of shareholders. Moreover, as firms facing higher competition are typically
exposed to a greater threat of liquidation, they have fewer opportunities to engage in wasteful
expenditure. This increased liquidation threat motivates managers to work more effectively and
efficiently (Schmidt, 1997). The intuition behind this argument is that if managers do not keep costs
down and improve operational efficiency, profit margins will decline due to intense competition
and firms will find it difficult to survive the competitive struggle. A growing body of empirical
literature supports this argument, showing that competition acts as an effective external governance
mechanism in determining various firm financial policies (Ammann et al., 2013; Bharath &
Hertzel, 2019; Boubaker et al., 2018; Chhaochharia et al., 2017; Giroud & Mueller, 2010; 2011;
Knyazeva & Knyazeva, 2012; Sassi et al., 2019).
From a related perspective, the increased number of firms in a competitive industry provides
managers and investors with additional information about rivals’ performance. Such information can
then serve as a benchmark to evaluate the ability and effort provided by managers through peer
comparison (Holmström, 1982; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983). Indeed, Fee and Hadlock (2000) provide
evidence that competition increases chief executive officer turnover, especially when firms under-
perform their rivals. Dasgupta et al. (2018) show that firm performance and productivity improve
after a forced turnover. Thus, there is evidence that the pressure effect of competition can help
mitigate managerial inefficiency by prompting managers to reduce costs and improve quality
(Baggs & de Bettignies, 2007), engage in corporate social responsibility (Flammer, 2015) and invest
sooner to preempt rivals in a high‐growth environment (Jiang et al., 2015).
However, the ‘dark side’ view of competition argues that competitive pressure in product markets
is likely to jeopardize a firm's survival and exacerbate its default risk. As firms in competitive markets
are constantly struggling for customers and market share, they face uncertainty about their future
performance. Indeed, Tirole (2010) explores theoretically the ‘profit destruction’ effect of product
market competition. According to Tirole's analytical model, competition reduces market power and
drives down profit margins, which in turn shrinks pledgeable income and exacerbates the difficulty in
raising external funds. The resulting limited access to external financing may hinder firms’ ability to
finance investment projects and lead them to lose investment opportunities to rivals. A related body
of research shows that financially stronger firms can increase investment to gain market share at the
expense of financially weaker rivals (i.e., those unable to finance investments with internally gen-
erated funds), thus driving them out of business (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990; Campello, 2003, 2006;
Chevalier, 1995). In a similar vein, Porter (1992) studies three broad determinants of investment: the
macroeconomic environment, capital allocation mechanisms and project‐specific conditions, with the
6Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 738) maintain that ‘product market competition is probably the most powerful force




latter related to payoffs from a new investment. Porter argues that these payoffs depend largely on the
competitive position of the investing firm, suggesting that competition erodes investment gains.
Overall, this strand of research shows that product market competition is likely to expose firms to
higher risk of bankruptcy by lowering expected profits and increasing predatory threats from rivals.
Empirical studies provide evidence in favour of the risk‐increasing effect of competition, showing that
intense competition exacerbates idiosyncratic fluctuations (e.g., Gaspar & Massa, 2006; Irvine &
Pontiff, 2009), increases the cost of debt (Xu, 2012) and induces firms to adopt hedging strategies to
reduce risk exposure (Haushalter et al., 2007).
The increased threat of bankruptcy arising from competition has important implications for
managerial decision‐making, as it pushes risk‐averse managers to opt for more conservative
financial decisions. Empirical studies support this argument. For instance, Xu (2012) finds that
competitive pressure from foreign rivals leads firms to decrease leverage through greater equity
issuance and asset sales. Similarly, MacKay and Phillips (2005) and Hoberg et al. (2014)
document evidence of conservative capital structure and payout decisions in highly competitive
industries. Frésard and Valta (2016) show that firms significantly decrease capital and R&D
investment in response to increased entry threats. Lyandres and Palazzo (2016) find that firms
tend to hold more cash when facing intense competition, in an attempt to invest more in
innovation and deter rivals from making similar investments. Overall, such conservative fi-
nancial strategies are likely to allow firms to escape the risk‐increasing effect of competition.
2.2 | Hypotheses
On the basis of our review of the implications of product market competition for corporate behaviour,
we develop two competing hypotheses regarding the impact of competitive threats on firm em-
ployment decisions. First, consistent with the ‘bright side’ view, we hypothesize that product market
competition helps improve labour investment efficiency. To the extent that competition serves as an
effective external governance mechanism, we expect it to reduce agency conflict associated with
labour investment choices, which can arise from overinvestment or underinvestment. Previous re-
search shows that opportunistic managers may engage in empire‐building through overinvestment.
In terms of labour decisions, such managers may engage in expansion activities that exceed their
optimal employment levels by overhiring new workers (Williamson, 1963). Another example of
labour overinvestment is the reluctance of self‐interested managers to divest unprofitable invest-
ments, such as an unproductive workforce (i.e., underfiring), as such divestment decisions could
damage their reputation (Boot, 1992; Jensen, 1986). Another form of agency problem is under-
investment in labour. This problem arises when entrenched managers are willing to pursue the ‘quiet
life’ and avoid costly effort through underinvestment. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) argue that,
in anticipation of substantial investment‐related costs, managers tend to forgo profitable investment
projects for the sake of private benefits. Accordingly, the underinvestment problem may result in
managers downsizing their labour force through underhiring and overfiring to minimize labour
investment costs.
Overall, following the ‘bright side’ view of competition, we predict that competitive pressure in
the product market that acts as an external disciplinary tool will mitigate suboptimal labour
investment decisions. Put differently, firms benefiting from the governance role of product market
competition are expected to invest in labour in a more efficient manner. This argument is con-
sistent with recent empirical evidence that inefficient labour investment decisions can be deterred
through effective disciplinary mechanisms, such as loss reporting (Pinnuck & Lillis, 2007)
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and long‐term institutional investor monitoring (Ghaly et al., 2020). In sum, this line of reasoning
leads to the following hypothesis:
H1a: Product market competition improves firm labour investment efficiency.
In contrast, following the ‘dark side’ view of competition, our competing hypothesis is that
product market competition lowers labour investment efficiency by impacting managerial in-
vestment incentives.7 This view suggests that firms facing greater product market competition
are more likely to underinvest or overinvest in labour, following two different mechanisms.
First, unlike firms with strong market power, those facing competitive pressure are not en-
dowed with the ability to pass on idiosyncratic shocks to their customers. Due to the aggressive
pricing strategies adopted by financially stronger rivals (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990), firms are
forced to drive prices down to the level of their marginal costs, which, in turn, reduces their
profits and exposes them to higher liquidation risk (Schmidt, 1997). If a firm is financially
constrained and has limited funds to invest, it runs the risk of being driven out of the market by
financially stronger rivals (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1990). Froot et al. (1993) refer to this risk as
predation risk and argue that the more interdependent firms’ investment opportunities are
within an industry, the greater the predation risk. Overall, dynamic interaction among firms in
competitive markets could expose firms to severe predatory threats from rivals, resulting in
higher bankruptcy risk.
Labour investment decisions provide an important avenue for managers to avoid bank-
ruptcy risks arising from product market competition. To the extent that the benefits of labour
investment are seen only in the long term, one could argue that managers, who are concerned
about short‐term survival, are likely to forgo costly investment in employees, leading to un-
derhiring and/or overfiring. This argument is consistent with the idea that managers may
sacrifice long‐term interests by postponing investments to boost current earnings (Porter, 1992;
Stein, 1988). In addition, the significant costs associated with human capital investment, such
as the costs of hiring, firing and training, are substantial and, to an extent, irreversible (e.g.,
Ghaly et al., 2020). Campello et al. (2018) show that firms facing high labour‐related costs due
to the role of organized labour incur higher bankruptcy costs, which are detrimental to other
corporate stakeholders. We argue that, to avoid incurring such costs, managers have incentives
to reduce investment in labour as a way to avoid adversely affecting current corporate per-
formance.8 Empirically, there is consistent evidence that labour‐related costs are an important
factor shaping firm employment policies (e.g., Blatter et al., 2012; Dube et al., 2010). Overall,
this line of argument suggests that the risk of default arising from competitive pressure may
lead to underinvestment in labour.
On the contrary, competition may create an overinvestment problem in labour, for two
main reasons. First, faced with competitive pressure, managers with short‐term incentive
horizons are likely to be more concerned about reputational loss. The premise behind this
idea is that, as competition exposes firms to severe predatory threats from rivals (Bolton &
Scharfstein, 1990), it pushes managers to engage in activities that improve their reputation,
which will, in turn, enable them to obtain external financing at better terms to fend off
7Beiner et al. (2011) provide evidence that beyond a particular level of competitive pressure, competition no longer acts
as a substitute for managerial incentive schemes and rather lowers firm values.
8As another example, Shleifer (2004) shows that firms facing higher competitive pressure tend to rely on child labour,




predation (Holmström, 1982; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983).9 From this perspective, one would
expect that managers facing competitive pressure signal to external investors their commit-
ment to maximizing stakeholder welfare by, for example, hiring an excessive number of
employees.10 Second, product market competitive pressure may exacerbate corporate mis-
conduct by inducing short‐termist managers to engage in unethical behaviour to protect their
private benefits. The presence of a large number of firms in a competitive industry facilitates
evaluation of managers compared to rivals (Holmström, 1982; Nalebuff & Stiglitz, 1983).
Consequently, managers are likely to be blamed for bad performance more often than they
would if their firm operated in a noncompetitive industry. Previous research suggests that
managers react to such concerns by painting a rosier picture of firm financial performance
through several unethical activities, including aggressive earnings management (Lee & Liu,
2016; Markarian & Santalo, 2014; Mitra et al., 2013), financial misreporting (Wang & Winton,
2012) and illegal tax‐minimizing methods (Gokalp et al., 2017). Another unethical manager
behaviour is to overinvest in labour and collude with employees to extract private benefits.
Indeed, several previous studies argue that, when managers face potential termination risk,
they may pursue more security and power by overinvesting in labour. Such overinvestment
practices can take the form of retaining (underfiring) an unproductive workforce (e.g.,
Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2003) and offering long‐term labour contracts and paying high
wages (Pagano & Volpin, 2005).11 Consequently, one would expect managers to adopt similar
overinvestment practices in the presence of competitive pressure as a way to protect their
private benefits.
The above arguments suggest that competitive pressure may lead to both underinvestment
and overinvestment in labour. Our alternative hypothesis is thus formulated as follows.
H1b: Product market competition lowers firm labour investment efficiency.
3 | DATA AND VARIABLES
3.1 | Sample selection
We consider a large sample of U.S. listed firms over the period 1998–2017.12 We begin with
all firms in the Compustat database for that period and collect data on the number of
employees and firm financial characteristics. We also obtain data on firm stock returns from
the Center for Research in Security Prices. To retrieve information on product market
9Previous studies argue that although firm reputation cannot be directly captured by financial statement variables, it is
considered important ‘soft information’ that is highly valuable to capital providers (Anginer et al., 2016; Armitage &
Marston, 2008; Cao et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2010).
10Attig et al. (2013) shed light on the importance of corporate social performance, including employee relations, for
firms’ credit ratings, suggesting that firms that comply with what is desired by society benefit from higher ratings and,
hence, lower financing costs.
11Pagano and Volpin (2005) show the importance of labour–management alliances against takeover threats. The
authors argue that workers are likely to act as ‘shark repellents’ thanks to their long‐term employment contracts that
make it harder for the raider to renegotiate wages and as ‘white squires’ for the incumbent managers by fighting and
voting against the takeover in an attempt to protect their high wages.
12The data on product market competition from the Hoberg and Phillips Data Library are available only from 1997
onward and, as we use lagged variables, our sample period begins in 1998.
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competition, we draw on the Hoberg and Phillips Data Library, which provides data on
industry classifications, competition intensity and industry concentration, starting from
1997 (Chi & Su, 2016; Hoberg et al., 2014; S. Li & Zhan, 2019).13 After merging data from
these sources, we drop firms with missing information on any of our key variables. These
restrictions result in a final sample of 22,962 firm‐year observations corresponding to 3139
unique firms over the period 1998–2017.
3.2 | Regression variables
3.2.1 | Estimation of labour investment efficiency
Our main dependent variable reflects inefficiency in firm labour investment and captures the
deviation of a firm's actual level of labour investment from its optimal level. To obtain this
measure, we first proxy for the actual level of labour investment using firm net hiring, defined
as the percentage change in number of employees from year t−1 to year t (Benmelech et al.,
2011; Ellul et al., 2018; Pinnuck & Lillis, 2007). We then follow the literature on both capital
and labour investment and define investment inefficiency in labour as the absolute difference
between the actual level of labour investment and its optimal level (Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer, 2016;
Biddle et al., 2009; Ghaly et al., 2020; Jung et al., 2014; Khedmati et al., 2019; Richardson, 2006;
Stoughton et al., 2017).
To proxy for the optimal level of labour investment, we employ a well‐established ap-
proach from prior economics, finance and accounting studies, which typically models the
optimal level of firm investment as a function of economic fundamentals. This approach
involves extending (reduced‐form) models of long‐run equilibrium labour demand in the
economics literature (e.g., Hamermesh, 1989), mainly by including additional firm‐specific
factors that determine firm net hiring practices (e.g., Ellul et al., 2018; Giroud & Mueller,
2017). As in recent studies of labour investment (e.g., Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer, 2016: Jung
et al., 2014: Khedmati et al., 2019), we rely particularly on the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007)
labour demand model, which predicts normal net hiring practices based on an extensive list
of industry‐ and firm‐level factors that capture underlying economic fundamentals. This
model is specified as follows:
a a a a
a a a a a
a a a a
a a a
a ε
NET_HIRE = + SALES_GROWTH + SALES_GROWTH + ΔROA
+ ΔROA + ROA + RETURN + SIZE_R + QUICK
+ ΔQUICK + ΔQUICK + LEV + LOSSBIN1
+ LOSSBIN2 + LOSSBIN3 + LOSSBIN4
+ LOSSBIN5 + Industry dummies + ,
it it i t it
i t it it i t i t
i t it i t i t
i t i t i t
i t it
0 1 2 , –1 3
4 , –1 5 6 7 , –1 8 , –1
9 , –1 10 11 , –1 12 , –1
13 , –1 14 , –1 15 , –1
16 , –1
(1)
where NET_HIRE is percentage change in number of employees; SALES_GROWTH is per-
centage change in firm total sales; ROA is firm profitability, defined as the ratio of net income




to total assets at the beginning of the year; RETURN is total stock return over the past 12
months; SIZE_R is percentile rank of firm size; QUICK is the ratio of cash and short‐term
investments plus receivables to current liabilities; LEV is the ratio of debt in current liabilities
plus total long‐term debt to total assets; LOSSBIN1 through LOSSBIN5 are five dummy vari-
ables that indicate losses ranging between zero and −0.025, where each variable refers to a
specific loss interval of 0.005 (i.e., LOSSBIN1 equals 1 if ROA ranges between zero and –0.005,
LOSSBIN2 equals 1 if ROA ranges between –0.005 and –0.010, etc.); and ‘Industry dummies’
are industry‐fixed effects, intended to capture time‐invariant (unobserved) industry‐specific
characteristics that could influence labour investment. Descriptive statistics of these variables
are reported in Appendix Table S1.
We estimate Equation (1) and consider the resulting fitted values of NET_HIRE as the
estimate of a firm's optimal level of firm labour investment, which we refer to as EX-
PECTED_NET_HIRE (see Appendix Table S2 for details on the results of this regression). We
then calculate our main measure of labour investment inefficiency (|AB_NET_HIRE|) as the
absolute difference between the actual and expected levels of labour investment. More speci-
fically, we define |AB_NET_HIRE|as follows:
 |AB_NET_HIRE = NET_HIRE–EXPECTED_NET_HIRE|. (2)
In sum, our measure of abnormal net hiring captures inefficiency in labour investment as it
reflects the remaining amount of labour investment unexplained by the underlying economic
factors in model (1). In Appendix Table S3, we further examine the relation of this measure
with firm value and operating performance. The results indicate that firms with higher
abnormal net hiring are likely to perform poorly, providing empirical support for the validity of
our measure of labour investment inefficiency. To further reinforce the reliability of our
inference, we conduct a battery of robustness checks by considering several modifications of
the Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) model, as well as alternative proxies for the optimal level of net
hiring.
3.2.2 | Product market competition measure
We use product market fluidity (FLUIDITY) as a proxy for the intensity of competition; this is a
text‐based measure developed by Hoberg et al. (2014) and is available online at the Hoberg and
Phillips Data Library.14 FLUIDITY reflects the competitive pressure the incumbent firm faces
from rivals’ product market threats. It, therefore, captures the extent to which a firm's product
market space changes due to rivals’ competitive behaviour. By making their products similar to
an incumbent firm's own products by entering the latter's product mix, rivals can exert greater
competitive pressure on the incumbent firm.
Hoberg et al. (2014) rely on 10‐K filings to collect data on firm product descriptions. For
each firm‐year, these authors construct a vector of all the words a firm uses to describe its own
products. They then compare this vector to another vector that identifies change in the overall
use of vocabulary of all other rivals between year t−1 and year t. FLUIDITY is the result of this
comparison; it is defined as the cosine similarity between a firm's own vector of words and the
14Data on product market competition are available at http://hobergphillips.tuck.dartmouth.edu.
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change in rivals’ vector of words. A higher value of FLUIDITY implies a greater change in
rivals’ words compared to words similar to the firm's own words. This change indicates that
rivals are adopting aggressive competitive behaviour by either converging toward the incum-
bent firm's products or differentiating themselves for better product quality and better market
opportunities. Overall, greater fluidity translates as a higher competitive threat and, thus, a
higher intensity of product market competition.
The FLUIDITY measure offers a number of advantages for our empirical analysis of the
impact of competition on labour investment efficiency. Unlike traditional industry con-
centration measures, which reflect intensity of competition at the industry level, FLUIDITY is
an ex‐ante measure that captures product market competitive threats at the firm level.15
In addition, it is highly representative of rivals’ competitive actions, which are relevant to
incumbent firm decisions. Importantly, as this measure captures competitive threats related to
the movements of rivals, it is likely to be exogenous to a firm's internal policies and decisions.
Given these advantages, several recent studies use FLUIDITY to examine the impact of
competition on corporate decisions (e.g., Chi & Su, 2016; Hoberg et al., 2014). We follow these
studies by using FLUIDITY to investigate how product market competition influences firm
labour investment decisions. Nevertheless, we also conduct robustness checks using alternative
measures that capture different dimensions of product market competition, including industry
concentration and market power.
3.2.3 | Control variables
Following the literature (e.g., Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer, 2016; Biddle et al., 2009; Jung et al.,
2014), we use a number of control variables shown to affect labour investment efficiency:
(1) MTB, market value of common equity scaled by shareholder equity; (2) SIZE, natural
logarithm of total assets; (3) QUICK, ratio of cash and short‐term investments plus
receivables to current liabilities; (4) LEVERAGE, ratio of debt in current liabilities plus total
long‐term debt to total assets; (5) DIVDUM, dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm
pays common dividends and zero otherwise; (6) STD_CFO, standard deviation of firm cash
flows from operations over the past 5 years; (7) STD_SALES, standard deviation of firm
sales over the past 5 years; (8) TANGIBLE, ratio of net property, plant and equipment to
total assets; (9) LOSS, dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm's ROA is negative
and zero otherwise; (10) STD_NET_HIRE, standard deviation of firm net hiring over the
past 5 years; (11) LABOR_INTENSITY, ratio of number of employees to total assets; and
(12) |AB_INVEST_OTHER|, absolute value of the residual from the regression of other
investments on sales growth. Appendix A provides detailed variable definitions and data
sources.
15Hoberg and Phillips (2016) develop another measure of competition, namely, the total similarity score (TSIMM).
However, while FLUIDITY is an ex‐ante measure that captures the threats from a firm's product market rivals due to
the change in their product descriptions, TSIMM is an ex‐post measure that reflects existing competitive pressure
through the similarity between a firm's product descriptions and those of its existing industry peers. Hence, we prefer to




3.2.4 | Model specification
To investigate the impact of product market competition on firm labour investment efficiency,
we estimate the following model:
β β β β β




|AB_NET_HIRE| = + FLUIDITY + MTB + SIZE + QUICK
+ LEV + DIVDUM + STD_CFO + STD_SALES
+ TANGIBLE + LOSS + STD_NET_HIRE
+ LABOR_INTENSITY + AB_INVEST_OTHER
+ Industry dummies + Year dummies + ,
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i t i t i t i t
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it
0 1 , –1 2 , –1 3 , –1 4 , –1
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9 , –1 10 , –1 11 , –1
12 , –1 13 , –1
(3)
where subscripts i and t represent firm i and year t, respectively. As discussed in detail above,
|AB_NET_HIRE| is our main proxy for labour investment inefficiency and captures the
deviation of actual net hiring from its optimal level, while FLUIDITY is our main proxy for
product market competitive threats. MTB, SIZE, QUICK, LEV, DIVDUM, STD_CFO,
STD_SALES, TANGIBLE, LOSS, STD_NET_HIRE, LABOR_INTENSITY and |AB_INVEST_-
OTHER|are firm‐level characteristics, as described above. Throughout our empirical analysis,
all variables are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles to minimize the effect of outliers.
Our model also includes industry‐ and year‐fixed effects to control for the remaining variation
in labour investment efficiency due to cross‐industry and time differences. In particular, use of
industry‐fixed effects helps reduce time‐invariant unobserved industry bias.
We do not include firm‐fixed effects in our baseline model specification, as firm‐fixed‐
effects regressions may fail to detect relationships in the data when the explanatory variable is
persistent (e.g., Chi & Su, 2016; Hoberg et al., 2014; Kjenstad et al., 2018; Platt, 2020). Indeed,
our independent variable (FLUIDITY) varies little over time for a given firm. Hoberg et al.
(2014) provide evidence that firms are likely to remain in the same fluidity quintile over the
1‐, 3‐ and 6‐year horizons. The persistence of competition over time is supported by many
studies investigating the impact of competitive pressure on firm‐level outcomes, such as payout
decisions (Hoberg et al., 2014), cash holding decisions (Chi & Su, 2016), financing decisions
(Kjenstad et al., 2018) and cost of debt (Platt, 2020). In unreported analysis, we provide further
empirical evidence of the persistence of FLUIDITY by performing a regression of FLUIDITY on
lagged FLUIDITY while controlling for year‐ and industry‐fixed effects. The results consistently
show that the coefficient on lagged FLUIDITY is positive, statistically significant and quite
close to 1, implying that fluidity is indeed persistent over time.
3.3 | Summary statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in our main analysis. Overall, our
variables are similar in magnitude to those in previous studies (e.g., Biddle et al., 2009; Hoberg
et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2014). For example, the mean (median) of our dependent variable,
abnormal net hiring, is 0.109 (0.074), indicating that the average actual change in number of
employees tends to deviate from its optimal level by about 11%. Previous papers show that the
average deviation of actual net hiring from its expected level ranges between 11% and 15%
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(Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014). In terms of product market competition, our
main independent variable (FLUIDITY) has an average value of 6.777, with a standard de-
viation of 3.527. These figures are largely in line with those of Hoberg et al. (2014), implying
that firms in our sample face relatively high product market threats from rivals. As for the other
control variables, we find that our sample firms exhibit similar characteristics as those in
related investment studies. In Appendix Table S4, we report pairwise correlation coefficients
among the variables included in our regression, showing that FLUIDITY is significantly and
positively correlated with |AB_NET_HIRE|. This preliminary evidence is consistent with the
‘dark side’ view of product market competition.
4 | EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
4.1 | Regression results
Table 2 presents our baseline regression results, obtained by estimating Equation (3), for the
whole sample (column (1)), as well as the overinvestment and underinvestment subsamples
(columns (2) and (3), respectively). Across all models, we report ordinary least squares re-
gression results, with standard errors clustered at the firm level. In column (1), the coefficient
on FLUIDITY is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the
TABLE 1 Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in our regressions. The sample comprises 22,962
observations for the period spanning 1998 through 2017. The list of variable definitions and data sources is
provided in Appendix A.
Variable N Mean SD 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile
|AB_NET_HIRE| 22,962 0.109 0.112 0.033 0.074 0.146
FLUIDITY 22,962 6.777 3.527 4.198 6.106 8.620
MTB 22,962 3.267 2.800 1.363 2.325 4.034
SIZE 22,962 5.616 1.746 4.276 5.528 6.883
QUICK 22,962 2.432 2.114 0.982 1.648 3.107
LEV 22,962 0.151 0.167 0.000 0.093 0.260
DIVDUM 22,962 0.247 0.431 0.000 0.000 0.000
STD_CFO 22,962 0.088 0.082 0.033 0.058 0.107
STD_SALES 22,962 0.181 0.137 0.078 0.138 0.242
TANGIBLE 22,962 0.200 0.166 0.070 0.148 0.284
LOSS 22,962 0.357 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000
STD_NET_HIRE 22,962 0.209 0.186 0.080 0.145 0.262
LABOR_INTENSITY 22,962 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.008




TABLE 2 The effect of product market competition on abnormal net hiring
This table reports the results of the ordinary least square regressions of abnormal net hiring on product market
competition and other firm characteristics for three subsamples: whole sample, overinvestment subsample that
comprises firms for which the actual level of net hiring exceeds its optimal level (positive abnormal net hiring)
and underinvestment subsample that comprises firms for which the observed level of net hiring is lower than its
optimal level (negative abnormal net hiring). The list of variable definitions and data sources is provided in
Appendix A. All reported absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for












FLUIDITYt‒1 0.002*** 0.001 0.002***
(5.03) (1.14) (7.06)
MTBt‒1 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*
(3.35) (3.44) (1.87)
SIZEt‒1 –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.002***
(4.18) (3.03) (2.89)
QUICKt‒1 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(9.18) (5.21) (9.00)
LEVt‒1 –0.005 –0.020** 0.012**
(0.88) (2.17) (1.99)
DIVDUMt‒1 –0.006*** –0.007* –0.001
(3.01) (1.92) (0.41)
STD_CFOt‒1 0.139*** 0.086*** 0.183***
(8.61) (3.19) (10.91)
STD_SALESt‒1 –0.007 0.016 –0.026***
(0.88) (1.27) (3.49)
TANGIBLEt‒1 0.006 0.007 –0.002
(0.83) (0.56) (0.29)
LOSSt‒1 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.019***
(8.91) (4.12) (9.69)
STD_NET_HIREt‒1 0.074*** 0.085*** 0.067***
(13.22) (8.51) (12.30)
LABOR_INTENSITYt‒1 0.062 –1.189*** 1.217***
(0.27) (2.99) (5.70)
|AB_INVEST_OTHER|t‒1 0.206*** 0.301*** 0.065***
(15.91) (16.43) (4.71)
(Continues)
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deviation of actual net hiring from its optimal level is increasing in product market competi-
tion. Our results are not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. For
instance, deviation of labour investment from its optimal level increases by 8% when moving
from the first to the third quartiles of FLUIDITY. To put these figures in context, if SIZE moves
from the first to the third quartile of its distribution, the abnormal amount of net hiring would
decrease by about 5%. In summary, our results are consistent with the ‘dark side’ view of
product market competition, which predicts that, because competitive pressure exposes firms
to higher bankruptcy risk, it increases managers’ concerns about firm performance, leading
them to forgo investment in labour that would adversely affect corporate earnings (Hypothesis
1b). This behaviour, thus, results in more suboptimal investment decisions, hence lowering
labour investment efficiency.
As for the control variables, we find that labour investment efficiency exhibits several
significant relations with firm characteristics. Larger firms (SIZE) and firms that pay
dividends (DIVDUM) tend to make more efficient labour investment decisions. In addition,
the coefficients on MTB, QUICK, STD_CFO, LOSS, STD_NET_HIRE and |AB_INVEST_-
OTHER| are all positive and statistically significant. These results suggest that suboptimal
labour investment is more prevalent among firms with higher growth opportunities, higher
liquidity ratios, higher operating risk, higher economic losses, higher volatility of labour
investment and lower efficiency of nonlabour investment. These results are largely con-
sistent with those of previous studies on labour investment efficiency (e.g., Ben‐Nasr &
Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014).
4.2 | Overinvestment versus underinvestment
To better understand the impact of product market competition on labour investment
decisions, we next examine two specific forms of labour investment inefficiency, over-
investment and underinvestment. We create two subsamples of firms based on the sign of
abnormal net hiring. The overinvesting group comprises firms whose actual level of net
hiring exceeds the optimal level (positive abnormal net hiring). The underinvesting group
includes firms whose observed level of net hiring is lower than the optimal level (negative












Intercept 0.057 0.053 0.077
(1.59) (1.64) (1.43)
Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,962 9,690 13,272




report the results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2. We find that product market compe-
tition loads positively and significantly on abnormal net hiring only for the underinvesting
subsample. This result suggests that competition distorts labour investment decisions
by exacerbating underinvestment rather than overinvestment, consistent with the
risk‐increasing effect of competition.16
We extend our analysis by further decomposing the overinvesting and underinvesting
subsamples based on the sign of the optimal level of net hiring, estimated based on model
(1). Specifically, we split the overinvesting subsample into two groups: overhiring firms
(i.e., firms that overinvest when their optimal net hiring is positive) and underfiring firms
(i.e., firms that overinvest while their optimal net hiring is negative). We repeat this ex-
ercise for the underinvesting group by splitting it into underhiring firms (i.e., firms that
underinvest when their optimal net hiring is positive) and overfiring firms (i.e., firms that
underinvest when their optimal net hiring is negative). Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3 present
the results of estimating model (3) for each of the four subsamples: overhiring, underfiring,
underhiring and overfiring groups, respectively. Consistent with our previous results, we
find that FLUIDITY has a positive and significant impact on abnormal net hiring only for
the subsample of underinvesting firms and, more specifically, the underhiring and
overfiring subsamples. This result bolsters the notion that firms facing intense competitive
pressure tend to reduce their investment in labour through underhiring and overfiring.
Overall, these findings provide additional evidence that product market competition
exacerbates underinvestment, hence significantly lowering actual investment levels below
those justified by economic fundamentals.
5 | ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND ENDOGENEITY
5.1 | Robustness tests
This section summarizes findings from a battery of robustness checks. For brevity, we report
the results from these tests in the online Supporting Information Appendix. First, we de-
monstrate that our main conclusion remains qualitatively unchanged using alternative proxies
for labour investment efficiency based on several improvements to the Pinnuck and Lillis
(2007) model of optimal net hiring as well as alternative definitions of optimal labour invest-
ment not based on this model (Section 3 of the online Supporting Information Appendix).
Second, we show that our main finding is insensitive to alternative measures of product market
competition, such as Herfindahl–Hirschman index, natural logarithm of number of firms
competing in an industry, Lerner index, excess price–cost margin and total similarity score
(Section 4 of the online Supporting Information Appendix). Third, we document evidence that
our baseline results persist after including firm‐fixed effects and additional control variables,
including those capturing information quality (Section 5 of the online Supporting Information
Appendix). Finally, we show that our statistical inference is not driven by the impact of
16In untabulated results, we corroborate this finding using the non‐absolute values of net hiring as an alternative
measure of labour investment inefficiency. The results show a negative and significant impact of competition on non‐
absolute net hiring, suggesting that competitive pressure leads firms’ actual level of labour investment to be sig-
nificantly lower than its expected level.
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TABLE 3 The effect of product market competition on overinvestment and underinvestment
This table reports the results of the ordinary least square regressions of abnormal net hiring on product market
competition and other firm characteristics for four subsamples: overhiring firms (those that overinvest when
their optimal net hiring is positive), underfiring firms (those that overinvest when their optimal net hiring is
negative), underhiring firms (those that underinvest when their optimal net hiring is positive) and overfiring
firms (those that underinvest when their optimal net hiring is negative). The list of variable definitions and data
sources is provided in Appendix A. All reported absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust standard
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, ** and *** refer to significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variables
Overinvestment Underinvestment
Overhiring(1) Underfiring(2) Underhiring(3) Overfiring(4)
FLUIDITYt‒1 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.06) (0.78) (6.21) (4.64)
MTBt‒1 0.001* 0.003*** –0.001*** 0.000
(1.84) (2.65) (3.48) (0.15)
SIZEt‒1 −0.004*** –0.004* –0.003*** 0.002***
(3.08) (1.88) (4.52) (2.76)
QUICKt‒1 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.004***
(3.89) (2.05) (6.19) (5.19)
LEVt‒1 –0.009 –0.025 0.021*** –0.012*
(0.88) (1.26) (2.76) (1.76)
DIVDUMt‒1 –0.005 –0.011 0.001 –0.000
(1.27) (1.38) (0.29) (0.17)
STD_CFOt‒1 0.033 0.223*** 0.221*** 0.040**
(1.16) (3.70) (10.29) (2.40)
STD_SALESt−1 0.028** –0.018 –0.028*** –0.009
(2.20) (0.56) (3.14) (0.98)
TANGIBLEt−1 –0.001 0.031 –0.002 –0.009
(0.08) (1.16) (0.21) (1.03)
LOSSt‒1 0.025*** 0.013** 0.027*** 0.011***
(5.81) (1.97) (10.15) (4.42)
STD_NET_HIREt‒1 0.080*** 0.092*** 0.081*** 0.019***
(7.26) (4.31) (12.00) (3.17)
LABOR_INTENSITYt‒1 –1.200*** –1.730** 0.995*** 1.022***
(2.85) (1.98) (3.98) (3.24)
|AB_INVEST_OTHER|t‒1 0.319*** 0.198*** 0.067*** 0.031*




nonlabour investments, such as R&D and capital expenditure (Section 6 of the online
Supporting Information Appendix).
5.2 | Endogeneity
Although our results thus far lend strong support for a negative relation between product
market competition and labour investment efficiency, they could suffer from endogeneity. As
mentioned, omitted factors could simultaneously influence competitive pressure in the product
market and the efficiency of labour investment, creating a spurious association between the
two. Another possibility is that labour investment decisions are highly relevant to firms’
competitive strategies, which, in turn, influences the intensity of competition in the product
market. This particular situation creates a reverse causality problem.
By employing FLUIDITY as the main proxy for product market competitive threats, we are
able to capture competitive pressure from moves made by rivals. This proxy is, thus, reasonably
exogenous to firm characteristics (e.g., Hoberg et al., 2014) and its use helps mitigate, to some
extent, endogeneity concerns. In addition, that our main results persist in tests controlling for
additional variables suggests that our inference is not likely affected by omitted‐variable bias.
Nonetheless, we attempt to further address endogeneity and identify the causal effect of pro-
duct market competition on labour investment efficiency in two distinct ways. First, we apply
the PSM technique to ensure that our findings are not driven by confounding effects due to
observable covariates. Second, we re‐examine the impact of competition on labour investment
efficiency in a quasi‐natural experimental setting, using large import tariff reductions as an
exogenous shock to product market competition.
5.2.1 | PSM
In our baseline model, we use a sample comprising both firms facing intense and firms facing
weak competitive pressure. One potential concern with this approach is that these two types of
firm could have fundamentally different characteristics. To address this issue, we utilize PSM to
control for observable differences in characteristics between firms facing high competition and




Overhiring(1) Underfiring(2) Underhiring(3) Overfiring(4)
Intercept 0.067 0.039 0.129** 0.016*
(1.46) (1.44) (2.16) (1.69)
Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7445 2245 10,299 2973
Adjusted R² 0.133 0.175 0.241 0.115
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FLUIDITY to a firm with below‐median FLUIDITY, based on a propensity score obtained from
a probit model that estimates the likelihood of a firm having above‐median FLUIDITY. We use
as predictors of this probit model all control variables in our baseline regression (3). After
calibrating the probit model, we match, without replacement, each firm with above‐median
FLUIDITY (treated firm) to a firm with below‐median FLUIDITY (control firm), using nearest‐
neighbour matching, common support and a maximum distance of 5%.17 To evaluate our
matching procedure, we study the characteristics of the treated and control firms before and
after matching. Section 7 of the online Supporting Information Appendix shows that, as ex-
pected, the differences between the covariates of the treated and control groups are significantly
reduced post‐matching. This suggests that our PSM procedure is successful and thus appears to
mimic the random assignment of subjects into treatment and control groups.
Panel (a) of Table 4 reports the PSM results. As expected, we find that firms facing intense
competition show higher abnormal net hiring than (propensity score matched) firms facing
weaker competition (0.116 vs. 0.102), with the difference (0.014) statistically significant at the
1% level. As in Table 2, we further examine the overinvestment and underinvestment sub-
samples. In particular, we perform the same matching procedure and investigate the difference
in abnormal net hiring between firms with FLUIDITY values above and below the median for
both subsamples. Consistent with our previous findings, there is a significant difference in
abnormal net hiring between treated and control firms only for the underinvestment sample,
suggesting that competition decreases labour investment efficiency by exacerbating
underinvestment.
In Panel (b) of Table 4, we replicate our baseline regression (3) using only the treatment and
matched samples described above. Again, we perform this regression for three sample com-
positions: (i) the whole sample (column (1)), (ii) the overinvestment subsample (column (2))
and (iii) the underinvestment subsample (column (3)). The results show that FLUIDITY has a
positive and significant impact on abnormal net hiring for the whole sample. As expected, the
results are insignificant for overinvesting firms. Overall, in line with our baseline findings,
these results show that product market competition is associated with inefficient investment
and, in particular, underinvestment in labour.
5.2.2 | Quasi‐natural experiment
Following previous studies (e.g., Frésard, 2010; Valta, 2012), we take advantage of a quasi‐
natural experimental setting to carry out a causal assessment of the role of product market
competition in reducing labour investment efficiency. More specifically, we examine the re-
sponse of firm labour investment decisions to intensification of foreign competition following
large reductions in import tariff rates.
Two of the most important economic forces that have strengthened competition in U.S.
product markets are gradual removal of international trade barriers (e.g., tariff rates and
transport costs) and globalization of business activity (Tybout, 2003). For example, the
Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 was intended to eliminate import and
export tariffs as a way of opening up U.S. local product markets to Canadian competitors,
leading to more intense competition. In fact, reductions in tariff rates reduce the cost of




TABLE 4 Propensity score matching analysis
(a) Differences in labour investment efficiency for matched samples
This table reports summary statistics used to test for differences in abnormal net hiring between firms with
above‐median FLUIDITY and matched firms with below‐median FLUIDITY. We report the results for the
whole sample, the overinvestment sample that comprises firms for which the actual level of net hiring
exceeds its optimal level (positive abnormal net hiring) and the underinvestment sample that comprises
firms for which the observed level of net hiring is lower than its optimal level (negative abnormal net
hiring). The list of variable definitions and data sources is provided in Appendix A. *, ** and *** refer to






AB_NET_HIRE 0.116 0.102 0.014***
Observations 4889 4889
Overinvestment sample
AB_NET_HIRE 0.133 0.127 0.006
Observations 1936 1936
Underinvestment sample
AB_NET_HIRE 0.097 0.089 0.008***
Observations 2781 2781
(b) Baseline regressions for matched samples
This table reports the results of the ordinary least square regressions of abnormal net hiring on FLUIDITY,
and other firm characteristics for the matched samples with varying levels of competitive pressure. The results
are reported for three subsamples: whole sample, overinvestment subsample, and underinvestment
subsample. The list of variable definitions and data sources is provided in Appendix A. All reported
absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variables
Whole
sample Overinvestment sample Underinvestment sample
FLUIDITYt–1 0.002*** 0.000 0.002***
(3.77) (0.22) (3.48)
Intercept 0.188 0.095*** 0.051
(1.86) (5.38) (1.10)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9778 3872 5562
Adjusted R² 0.128 0.131 0.156
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entering domestic product markets, which attracts more foreign rivals and increases import
penetration. In addition, foreign rivals can adopt aggressive competitive strategies by modifying
their products and undertaking more innovative activities. This particular situation causes
disruption for domestic firms, which, in turn, leads them to react strategically by adjusting their
investment decisions (e.g., Frésard & Valta, 2016). In the context of the present study, large
tariff reductions offer an opportune setting to capture an exogenous shock to market compe-
tition. Our main measure of competition is product market fluidity, which captures the change
in a firm's product market space due to moves by rivals (Hoberg et al., 2014). To the extent that
tariff reductions lower the cost of entry to U.S. product markets, they facilitate penetration by
foreign rivals that may supply cheaper and more competitive goods and services in domestic
markets (Frésard & Valta, 2016). Consequently, the product spaces of firms and their domestic
rivals become significantly threatened due to the competitive pressure imposed by foreign
competitors. In response, both firms and their rivals are expected to adjust their products and
services appropriately through product convergence and/or differentiation, leading to changes
to product descriptions and ultimately the (cosine) similarity among those descriptions; this is
the concept captured by FLUIDITY. Hence, reductions in import tariff rates are likely to affect
firm product market competition.18
We use a difference‐in‐differences (DID) estimation approach to examine how labour in-
vestment decisions react to large tariff reductions. We first obtain tariff data using U.S. trade
data available at the Harmonized System product level from Schott's International Economics
Resource Page. Schott (2010) also provides Trade Data and Concordance Tables, which map
each Harmonized System product code into SIC manufacturing industry codes. Using this
mapping, we calculate the ad valorem import tariff rates for each three‐digit SIC industry as the
ratio of duties collected from that industry to the dutiable value of all imports.19 Following
Huang et al. (2017), we define large tariff reduction events as industry‐year observations in
which the decrease in tariff rates exceeds twice the industry mean tariff reduction. The above‐
described process yields a data set of 3041 firms operating in 112 three‐digit SIC code manu-
facturing industries, 90 of which experienced a tariff reduction shock at least once between
1998 and 2017. The tariff reduction events among these industries are staggered, as they
occurred at different times; this offers a better setting than single events, as they mitigate the
concern that our findings are driven by other concurrent events (Huang et al., 2017).
We define firms that operate in industries affected by a competitive shock in a given year as
the treated group. All firms operating in industries that did not experience a large tariff re-
duction event are included in the control group. To control for observable differences between
the two groups of firms, we identify a sample of matched firms that exhibit similar char-
acteristics as the treated group, except for the entry threats they face. Following Frésard and
18In an additional analysis, we consider a measure of foreign competitive pressure that is highly correlated with the
exogenous shock based on large tariff rate reductions. More specifically, we re‐estimate our baseline regression using
the (industry‐level) import penetration index (IMPORT_PENETRATION) as an alternative measure of competition. We
calculate the IMPORT_PENETRATION for each industry as the percentage of total imports on the sum of imports and
domestic production. Consistent with our main inference, we find that import competition exacerbates the under-
investment problem in labour. This finding suggests that our baseline findings are also driven by foreign competition,
captured by a direct measure, IMPORT_PENETRATION. For the sake of brevity, these additional empirical results are
not reported, but are available from the authors upon request.
19We first download tariff data from Schott's International Economics Resource Page (http://faculty.som.yale.edu/
peterschott/sub_international.htm) up to 2005. We then update the data up to 2017 using import and export data,




Valta (2016), we match each treated observation to its nearest‐neighbour observation that is
closest in terms of its probability of being affected by a competitive shock event. This prob-
ability is calculated based on a probit model that estimates the likelihood of a large tariff
reduction event on the basis of firm size (SIZE), investment opportunities (MTB) and firm
leverage (LEV) (Mattei & Platikanova, 2017). The matching procedure yields a sample of 15,232
firm‐year observations equally distributed among firms operating in industries that experienced
a tariff reduction event and those that did not.
Following Valta (2012) and Huang et al. (2017), we conduct a DID analysis by replicating our
baseline regressions using the dummy variable SHOCK as our main proxy for product market
competitive pressure. SHOCK takes the value 1 if there is a substantial decrease in tariff rates
exceeding two times the industry mean tariff reduction and zero otherwise. Panel (a) of Table 5
displays the results of our DID estimations. The results from the specification without control
variables (column (1)) show that tariff reduction shocks positively and significantly influence the
abnormal level of net hiring. Column (3) shows that inclusion of the control variables decreases
neither the statistical nor the economic significance of the result. As a robustness check, we further
control for firm‐fixed effects in our DID regressions. The results reported in columns (2) and (4)
show that the positive impact of SHOCK on abnormal net hiring continues to hold, suggesting that
our inference is unlikely to be affected by potential heterogeneity bias. Overall, these findings
suggest that, following large tariff cuts, firms are likely to experience an increase in abnormal net
hiring, which translates into inefficient labour investment decisions.
The key assumption for the validity of our DID analysis is the presence of parallel trends. The
DID analysis requires that, in the pre‐event period, the outcome variable (i.e., abnormal net hiring)
for the treated and control groups follows parallel trends. If we were to observe a pretreatment
trend of decreasing labour investment efficiency before the occurrence of the tariff reduction shock,
there would be a reverse causality problem, which would cast doubt on the validity of our DID. To
mitigate this concern, in Panel (b) of Table 5, we follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and
conduct a parallel‐trends test by examining the dynamics of abnormal net hiring surrounding tariff
reduction shocks. In particular, we run a regression that explains abnormal net hiring in terms of
different firm characteristics, along with four indicator variables that reflect four periods around the
tariff reduction shock. These variables are denoted Before2+, Before1, After1 and After2+, which are
equal to 1 if the firm operates in an industry that experiences a tariff reduction shock in at least 2
years, experiences a tariff reduction shock in 1 year, experienced a tariff reduction shock 1 year ago
and experienced a tariff reduction shock at least 2 years ago, respectively. The results, reported in
column (1) of Panel (b), Table 5, show that the coefficient estimates of Before2+ and Before1 are
close to zero and statistically insignificant, indicating no pretreatment trend. However, the coef-
ficients on After1 and After2+ are positive and significant, suggesting that the increase in abnormal
net hiring occurs only after the tariff reduction shock. Overall, these results imply that the observed
relationship between product market competition and labour investment efficiency is unlikely
driven by reverse causality and that our matched sample meets the parallel trends assumption.
One additional concern about the DID setting is that the observed results could be inter-
preted as evidence that abnormal net hiring is driven by other concurrent events rather than by
tariff reduction shocks. To mitigate the concern that our findings are confounded by such
events, we perform a placebo analysis by simulating pseudocompetitive events. Specifically, we
create a new dummy variable (PLACEBO) by randomly assigning falsified tariff reduction
events to each three‐digit SIC code industry. In so doing, we require the number of randomly
assigned events to match the number of actual tariff reduction events used in the analysis. If the
placebo dummy were to explain the variation in abnormal net hiring, it would raise doubts
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TABLE 5 Addressing endogeneity: The quasi‐natural experiment
(a) Difference‐in‐difference regressions
This table reports the results of the difference‐in‐difference analysis. The dependent variable is abnormal net
hiring. The independent variable is SHOCK which is equal to one if the industry has experienced a large tariff
reduction that is larger than two times the industry mean reduction and zero otherwise. The list of variable
definitions and data sources is provided in Appendix A. All reported absolute t values in parentheses are
based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the industry level. *, ** and
*** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.










SHOCKt–1 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019**
(3.28) (2.79) (3.22) (2.55)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm‐fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Observations 15,232 15,232 15,232 15,232
Adjusted R² 0.069 0.195 0.124 0.221
(b) Validity of difference‐in‐difference analysis
This table reports the results on the validity of the difference‐in‐difference regressions. In column (1), we
perform the parallel trends assumption test. Before2+, Before1, After1, and After2+ are dummy variables that
are equal to one if the firm operates in an industry that will experience a tariff reduction shock in 2 or more
years, will experience a tariff reduction shock in 1 year, experienced a tariff reduction shock 1 year ago, and
experienced a tariff reduction shock 2 or more years ago, respectively, and zero otherwise. In column (2),
we conduct a placebo test where the independent variable is a falsified dummy that randomly assigns the
tariff reduction events to each three‐digit SIC industry. The list of variable definitions and data sources is
provided in Appendix A. All reported absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the industry level. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)










about the role of competitive shocks in driving labour investment decisions. Column (2) of
Panel (b), Table 5 shows that the coefficient on PLACEBO is insignificant. Thus, we find no
evidence that our results are driven by concurrent unobserved events other than the tariff
reduction shocks. Overall, the results of our quasi‐natural experiment corroborate our in-
ference that product market competition leads firms to make less efficient labour investment
decisions.20
Taken together, the results from our identification strategies consistently show that, after
addressing potential endogeneity in the relation between product market competition and
employment decisions, competitive pressure remains negatively associated with labour in-
vestment efficiency. While it is impossible to completely rule out endogeneity concerns, our
main inferences are not likely driven by such problems.
TABLE 5 (Continued)
(b) Validity of difference‐in‐difference analysis
This table reports the results on the validity of the difference‐in‐difference regressions. In column (1), we
perform the parallel trends assumption test. Before2+, Before1, After1, and After2+ are dummy variables that
are equal to one if the firm operates in an industry that will experience a tariff reduction shock in 2 or more
years, will experience a tariff reduction shock in 1 year, experienced a tariff reduction shock 1 year ago, and
experienced a tariff reduction shock 2 or more years ago, respectively, and zero otherwise. In column (2),
we conduct a placebo test where the independent variable is a falsified dummy that randomly assigns the
tariff reduction events to each three‐digit SIC industry. The list of variable definitions and data sources is
provided in Appendix A. All reported absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the industry level. *, **, and *** refer to significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)






Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 15,232 15,232
Adjusted R² 0.209 0.122
20In untabulated regressions, we also perform an instrumental variable analysis using a plausibly exogenous instru-
ment of product market competition, that is, import tariff rates. Our results remain qualitatively the same, further
suggesting that our previous findings are unlikely to be affected by endogeneity concerns.
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6 | CROSS ‐SECTIONAL HETEROGENEITY
This section delves more deeply into the observed negative relation between competition and
labour investment efficiency by examining how it varies in the cross‐section. In so doing, our
analysis attempts not only to shed light on the channels through which our documented
relation operates, but also to strengthen identification, because similar patterns are unlikely to
arise if product market competition captures simply the effect of unobserved economic forces.
We expect the negative impact of competition on labour investment efficiency to be particularly
strong in the presence of factors that exacerbate the risk‐increasing effect of competition. We
specifically test the role of three factors: exposure to competitive pressure, financial constraints
and LACs.
TABLE 6 The role of exposure to competition
This table reports regression results on the impact of exposure to competition on the relation between product
market competition and labour investment inefficiency. MARKET_SHARE is firm‐level market share, defined
as firm sales divided by industry sales. DIVERSIFIED is a dummy variable that takes one if a firm has more
than one business segment and zero otherwise. All reported absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The list of variables definitions
and data sources is provided in Appendix A. *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.














Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 22,957 22,957




6.1 | Role of exposure to competitive pressure
First, we examine whether the impact of competition on labour investment decisions is in-
fluenced by the extent to which firms are exposed to competitive threats. Intuitively, firms with
stronger market power are less likely to be threatened by competition, as they have sustainable
moats. However, firms in a disadvantaged market position could be more vulnerable to com-
petition due to their inability to handle competitive threats. Accordingly, we expect firms that
are more exposed to competitive pressure to be more sensitive to the risk‐increasing effect of
competition, which creates a more severe labour underinvestment problem.
We consider the effects of two main features that characterize exposure to competitive
threats. We begin with firm competitive position, as firms with a weaker position in the product
market face more intense competition. To proxy for this, we use a firm‐level measure, MAR-
KET_SHARE, calculated as the fraction of firm sales in total industry sales (Valta, 2012). We
then consider the degree of firm diversification, as conglomerate firms have the advantage of
spreading risk across many industry segments, thus overcoming problems occurring in any
particular segment (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 2018). To capture the degree to which a firm is
diversified, we code a dummy variable for business diversification (DIVERSIFIED), which is
drawn from Compustat's business segment files. DIVERSIFIED takes the value 1 if the firm has
more than 1 business segment for a particular year and zero otherwise.
Table 6 reports findings from estimating two regression models; additionally, it includes
MARKET_SHARE and DIVERSIFIED along with their interaction terms with FLUIDITY. The
results provide consistent support for our prediction. Specifically, we find that the positive
impact of competition on abnormal net hiring is more pronounced for firms with a weaker
market position (column (1)), in line with the argument that such firms are more vulnerable to
the risk‐increasing effect of competition. Additionally, the competition–labour investment re-
lationship is more significant for undiversified firms (column (2)), consistent with the pre-
diction that standalone firms are more subject to competitive pressure. Overall, our findings
corroborate the notion that firm reactions to intensification of product market competition
increase with their exposure to competitive pressure.
6.2 | Role of financial constraints
As suggested by Lyandres and Palazzo (2016), financial constraints are crucial in determining
firms’ strategic choices under intense competition. We, therefore, investigate whether and how
financial constraints influence the role of the risk‐increasing effect of competition in shaping
labour investment decisions. According to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), when firms have
binding financial constraints, they are more vulnerable to the aggressive predatory behaviour of
financially stronger rivals. This particular situation could discourage managerial investment
incentives, hence creating an underinvestment problem. Additionally, to the extent that fi-
nancial constraints limit access to external financing, they are likely to hamper firms’ ability to
fund investment projects (Campello, 2006), such as labour investment. Consequently, one
would anticipate the risk‐increasing effect of competition to play a larger role in inducing
financially constrained firms to spend less on labour investment. Overall, we expect the ne-
gative impact of competition on labour investment efficiency to be more pronounced for fi-
nancially constrained firms than for their unconstrained counterparts.
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We follow the literature and use four firm‐specific measures of financial constraints. First,
we rely on firm size (SIZE), as larger firms are likely to enjoy privileged access to external
financing and hence are less financially constrained. Second, we employ firm leverage (LEV),
as highly levered firms are more likely to face tight financial covenant restrictions and hence
greater financial constraints. Third, we use the Whited–Wu index (WW), which captures
smaller firms with higher leverage, higher growth rates and lower cash flows (Whited & Wu,
2006). Higher values of WW indicate tighter financial constraints. Fourth, we proxy for fi-
nancial constraints using the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) size and age index (HP). Similar to the
WW index, higher values of the HP index indicate more severe financial constraints.
TABLE 7 The role of financial constraints
This table reports regression results on the impact of financial constraints on the relation between product
market competition and labour investment efficiency. WW is the Whited and Wu (2006) financial constraint
index. HP is the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) financial constraint index. All reported absolute t values in
parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
The list of variables definitions and data sources is provided in Appendix A. *, ** and *** refer to significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variables Firm size (1) Firm leverage (2) Whited–Wu index (3) HP index (4)
FLUIDITYt−1 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(5.35) (4.27) (8.03) (5.14)
FLUIDITYt–1 × SIZEt−1 –0.001*
(1.68)








FLUIDITYt–1 × HPt–1 0.001*
(1.66)
Intercept 0.079*** 0.049*** 0.077*** 0.013
(14.35) (8.95) (15.82) (0.98)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,957 22,961 20,461 21,010




To investigate how the effects of competitive pressure vary across firms with different
degrees of financial constraint, we include the interaction terms between each of the measures
discussed above and FLUIDITY. As shown in Table 7, we find evidence consistent with our
prediction. In particular, the efficiency of labour investment is significantly lower for firms with
more binding financial constraints, namely, smaller firms, highly leveraged firms and firms
with higher values of WW and HP indices. Overall, this evidence suggests that financially
constrained firms react more strongly to intensified competitive pressure by reducing their
labour investment.
6.3 | Role of information asymmetry
Our results thus far suggest that the risk‐increasing effect of product market competitive
pressure has a negative and significant impact on labour investment efficiency. However, this
effect may depend on the extent of information asymmetry between a firm and its investors,
because firms suffering from more severe asymmetry information problems are more vulner-
able to aggressive predation threats from rivals. For example, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)
stress that stringent debt covenants arising from information asymmetry between a firm and its
investors can hinder the firm's ability to fight competition, thus prompting financially stronger
rivals to pursue predatory market strategies. Consistent with this suggestion, Billett et al. (2017)
show that asymmetric information in financial markets negatively affects market share out-
comes in product markets. We, therefore, argue that information asymmetry may impose a
greater competitive risk on incumbent firms and, consequently, increase their sensitivity to the
risk‐increasing effect of product market competition.21 Accordingly, we expect information
asymmetry problems to exacerbate the role of product market competition in distorting labour
investment efficiency.
In our cross‐sectional analysis, we consider three proxies for information asymmetry. First,
we employ analyst coverage (ANALYST) as a measure of the quality of the information en-
vironment (Lang & Lundholm, 1996), as analysts can help improve the flow of information to
financial markets through their screening activities. We define ANALYST as the number of
financial analysts following a firm as reported by I/B/E/S. For ease of interpretation, we
multiply ANALYST by (−1) so that higher values indicate higher information asymmetry.
Second, we use analyst forecast errors (FORECAST_ERROR) as a proxy for information opa-
city, as forecast errors reflect a lack of precise information that would help analysts provide
accurate and less biased forecasts. We define FORECAST_ERROR as the absolute value of the
difference between announced earnings and the mean of estimated earnings, scaled by the
mean of analyst forecasts. The higher the forecast error, the higher the information opacity.
Third, we rely on earnings volatility (EARNING_VOL) as another measure of information
opacity, as highly volatile earnings are likely to reflect discretionary reporting choices made by
managers to smooth earnings. The higher the earnings volatility, the higher the asymmetry of
information between insiders and outsiders (Minton & Schrand, 1999). We calculate EARN-
ING_VOL as the ratio of the standard deviation of earnings to average book asset size over the
past eight quarters.
21Another strand of literature focuses on the direct impact of information asymmetry on corporate investment effi-
ciency, suggesting that moral hazard and adverse selection problems can hamper efficient investment in environments
where informational asymmetries are exacerbated (e.g., Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Biddle et al., 2009; Jung et al., 2014).
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Table 8 reports the results of the impact of information asymmetry on the relation
between product market competition and labour investment efficiency. Consistent with the
arguments described above, we find, in column (1), that the positive impact of product
market fluidity on abnormal net hiring is more pronounced for firms followed by fewer
analysts. More specifically, the coefficient on the interaction term FLUIDITYt–1 ×
ANALYST is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the abnormal investment
TABLE 8 The role of information asymmetry
This table reports regression results on the impact of information asymmetry on the relation between product
market competition and labour investment efficiency. ANALYST is the number of financial analysts following a
firm. FORECAST_ERROR is the absolute value of the difference between the announced earnings and mean of
estimated earnings scaled by the mean of analyst forecasts. EARNING_VOL is the ratio of the standard
deviation of the past eight earnings to the average book asset size over the past eight quarters. All reported
absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the firm level. The list of variables definitions and data sources is provided in Appendix A.




















FLUIDITYt–1 × EARNING_VOL 0.010***
(5.06)
Intercept 0.121 0.088* 0.160***
(1.50) (1.86) (3.35)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,159 18,141 12,636




in labour arising from the risk‐increasing effect of competition is stronger when firms suffer
greater information asymmetry. We reach similar conclusions using analyst forecast error
and earnings volatility as proxies for information asymmetry (columns (2) and (3), re-
spectively). Overall, these findings confirm that labour investment distortions are more
likely to arise in low‐quality information environments.
7 | ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
7.1 | LACs
As briefly discussed in Sections 1 and 2, labour investment is associated with high labour costs,
including the costs of searching, selection, hiring, training, firing and wages (e.g., Dixit, 1997).
These costs vary among firms (e.g., Blatter et al., 2012; Dube et al., 2010) and can hinder
managers’ efficient employment decisions by discouraging them from investing in labour.
Accordingly, when LACs are high, we expect the risk‐increasing effect of competition to play a
larger role in exacerbating labour investment inefficiency.
Our first proxy for LACs is labour unionization. Labour unions are likely to represent an
important obstacle to reallocation of resources, which could, in turn, have a bearing on labour
investment decisions and labour investment efficiency. Chen et al. (2011) argue that labour
unions could reduce firm operating flexibility, as they increase the costs of labour adjustments.
For example, union bargaining power makes wages sticky, thereby increasing the costs asso-
ciated with retaining existing workers and hiring new ones. This situation can distort firm
hiring decisions and lead to lower investment efficiency. Following previous work (e.g.,
Ben‐Nasr & Alshwer, 2016; Jung et al., 2014), we proxy for industry‐level labour union coverage
using data from the Union Membership and Coverage Database developed by Hirsch and
Macpherson (2003).22 On the basis of information collected from the monthly Current Popu-
lation Survey conducted by the Bureau of Labour Statistics, this database provides data on
labour union membership and coverage for both the public and private sectors at the Census
Industry Classification (CIC) industry level. After mapping CIC codes to NAICS and SIC codes
from Compustat, we measure labour force unionization (LABOR_UNION) as the proportion of
employees in a given firm's industry covered by unions in collective bargaining with employers.
The higher the industry unionization rate, the more bargaining power employees have and the
higher the LACs firms incur.23
In addition, we use measures of human capital intensity as additional proxies for LACs. The
cost of adjusting labour is likely to be higher for human‐capital‐intensive industries that rely
more on talented employees. The idea here is that human‐capital‐intensive firms face serious
challenges in attracting and ‘star’ employees, who are a key resource for firm competitive
advantage and long‐term organizational performance (Blatter et al., 2012; Dube et al., 2010;
Pfeffer, 1994). These challenges make such firms highly exposed to labour market frictions,
22These data are available at www.unionstats.com.
23Using the labour unionization rate at the industry level, rather than at the firm level, has the advantage of including
the unionization spillover effect, which accounts for the possibility that the strength of a labour union is not confined to
its own firm, but rather threatens other firms in the same industry (Rosen, 1969). This spillover effect is important in
large‐scale studies like ours, in which firm‐level unionization data cannot be collected, as firms are not compelled to
disclose employee union membership.
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thus increasing their LACs. For example, Chang and Jo (2019) document that firms operating
in competitive and innovative industries that rely on talented human resources invest more in
employee‐friendly practices to retain talented employees and achieve greater innovation suc-
cess. Accordingly, as human capital intensity increases LACs, we expect it to exacerbate the
role of competition in hindering firms’ ability to efficiently invest in labour.
To proxy for human capital intensity, we first use the degree of firm reliance on skilled
labour (e.g., Belo et al., 2017; Dixit, 1997; Ghaly et al., 2017), as skilled workers are often seen as
an important determinant of firm success, hence requiring greater financial commitment than
does unskilled labour. For example, Ghaly et al. (2017) provide evidence that firms relying on a
greater share of skilled labour face higher LACs and hence tend to hold more cash reserves as a
precautionary measure. Following Belo et al. (2017) and Ghaly et al. (2017), we collect
information on Job Zones from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). We also
retrieve data on number of employees by occupation from the Occupational Employment
Statistics of the Bureau of Labour Statistics. We then calculate the industry‐specific index of
reliance on labour skills (LABOR_SKILL) as the weighted average number of employees
working in different occupations per industry, where the weight is the U.S. Department of
Labor's O*NET program classification of occupations based on worker skill levels.24 More













where Eji is number of employees working in industry i for particular occupation j, Ei is total
employees in industry i, O is number of occupations in industry i and Zj is skill level of
occupation j determined by the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET program classification of
occupations.
In addition to labour skills, we use two other measures of human capital intensity as proxies
for LACs. First, we use the ratio of R&D‐to‐sales (R&D), as R&D and innovation activities
increase demand for talented workers to create additional value. We also note that firms with
high R&D spending and more talent are likely to have substantial human and knowledge
capital, an important intangible asset (Klasa et al., 2018). Hence, we follow recent finance
research (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013; Falato et al., 2021) and use a more encompassing
measure of human capital intensity than labour skills and R&D spending, namely a measure of
intangible capital (INTANGIBLE) developed by Peters and Taylor (2017), who consider two
types of intangible capital, internally created intangible capital and externally purchased in-
tangible capital. Externally purchased intangible capital is measured using the balance sheet
item ‘Intangible Assets’, while internally created intangible capital is the sum of knowledge
capital (i.e., accumulated past R&D spending) and organizational capital (i.e., accumulated past
SG&A expenses). Firms with more R&D spending and intangible capital are expected to have a
greater degree of human capital intensity and thus face higher LACs.
To gauge the impact of LACs on the relation between competition and labour investment
efficiency, we re‐estimate our baseline model, including the interaction terms between
24The O*NET skill level is determined through the education, work experience and training that an employee would




TABLE 9 The role of labour and capital adjustment costs
This table reports regression results on the role of labour and capital adjustment costs (LACs and CACs). In
columns (1), (2), (3) and (4), we report results on the impact of LACs on the relation between product market
competition and labour investment efficiency, where LACs are measured as the industry labour force
unionization (column 1), firms’ reliance on skilled labour (column (2)), firms’ R&D spending (column 3), and
firms’ intangible capital (column (4)). LABOR_UNION is the percentage of employees covered by labour
unions. LABOR_SKILL is the industry weighted average number of employees working in different occupations
where the weight is the O*NET program classification of occupations based on skill level. R&D is the ratio of
R&D expenditure to total sales. INTANGIBLE is calculated as the sum of externally purchased intangible
capital measured using the balance sheet item ‘Intangible Assets’, and internally created intangible capital,
which is the sum of knowledge capital (i.e., cumulated past R&D spending) and organizational capital (i.e.,
cumulated past SG&A expenses). In column (5), we report results on the impact of differences between LACs
and CACs on the relation between product market competition and labour investment efficiency. We proxy for
CACs using firms’ asset redeployability (Kim & Kung, 2017). All absolute reported t values in parentheses are
based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The list of
variables definitions and data sources is provided in Appendix A. *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%,
















FLUIDITYt–1 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.002***
(1.79) (2.33) (2.39) (2.77) (3.12)
LABOR_UNION –0.001
(1.45)
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FLUIDITY and our four proxies for LACs (i.e., LABOR_UNION, LABOR_SKILL, R&D and
INTANGIBLE). Table 9 presents the regression results. In column (1), the coefficient on the
interaction term FLUIDITY × LABOR_UNION is positive and statistically significant,
indicating that the positive relation between competitive pressure and labour investment
inefficiency is more pronounced for firms in highly unionized industries, which hence have
higher LACs. We reach similar conclusions for human‐capital‐intensive firms, which are also
likely to face higher LACs. Specifically, columns (2), (3) and (4) show that the role of com-
petition in exacerbating labour investment inefficiency is stronger for firms with greater re-
liance on skilled labour (LABOR_SKILL), higher R&D spending (R&D and higher intangible
capital (INTANGIBLE), respectively. Overall, these results support our prediction that LACs
aggravate distortions in labour investment inefficiency created by the risk‐increasing effect of
competition.
7.2 | Difference between CACs and LACs
One relevant question that arises from the literature is whether evidence on the relation
between competition and nonlabour investment is applicable to labour investment. In previous
tests (Sections 4.1 and 5.1), we show that the effect of competition on labour investment is not
driven by its correlation with nonlabour investment. To further address this concern, we follow
Ghaly et al. (2020) and conduct an additional analysis to exploit the differences between LACs
and CACs. This analysis shows that these differences can impact the relation between com-
petition and labour investment efficiency.25 More importantly, this test shows that the risk‐

















FLUIDITYt–1 × LACs/CACs 0.253***
(4.14)
Intercept 0.044*** 0.088*** 0.062 0.067* 0.094***
(8.00) (9.78) (1.64) (1.82) (15.33)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,309 19,418 22,902 22,123 18,763
Adjusted R² 0.153 0.139 0.151 0.151 0.140




across all types of investment and that they are more pronounced for the investment type with
higher adjustment costs.
A major difference between labour and nonlabour investment is factor adjustment costs.26
To the extent that the magnitude of such costs determines firm investment strategies, one
would expect that the more different LACs are from CACs, the greater the difference between
the impact of competition on labour investment compared to capital investment. On the basis
of the idea that LACs are generally lower than CACs (Bloom, 2009; Shapiro, 1986),27 two
alternative views may be proposed regarding the expected role of the difference between LACs
and CACs in driving the relation between product market competition and labour investment
efficiency. First, the effect of competitive pressure could be weaker for capital investment and
more pronounced for labour investment if firms faced with relatively higher CACs than LACs
already have stronger incentives to maintain capital investment efficiency to avoid the rela-
tively high adjustment costs. Second, and in contrast, when CACs are relatively higher than
LACs, firms may find it more difficult to adjust to the optimal level of capital investment,
leading to a higher degree of capital investment inefficiency; this argument suggests that the
risk‐increasing effect of competition could be more pronounced for capital investment than for
labour investment. Overall, despite their conflicting predictions, these arguments suggest that
the effect of competition on labour investment efficiency is likely to differ from that on capital
investment efficiency and to vary with the difference between LACs and CACs.
The results (columns (1)–(4)) in Table 9 show that the role of competition in exacerbating
the underinvestment problem in labour is more pronounced when LACs are higher. On the
basis of this finding and our reasoning above, one would expect that when LACs are relatively
higher than CACs (i.e., when the LAC‐to‐CAC ratio is higher), the role of competition in
reducing investment in labour becomes more important than that of discouraging investment
in capital and vice versa. To test this prediction, we add to our baseline model an additional
interaction term between FLUIDITY and the LAC‐to‐CAC ratio. We proxy for LACs using firm
reliance on skilled labour, as described above. For CACs, we rely on a firm‐level measure of
asset redeployability (Kim & Kung, 2017), which reflects the possibility that a firm's underlying
assets could have alternative uses across and within industries. This measure is constructed
using the 1997 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) capital flow table, which breaks down
expenditures on new equipment, software and structures by 180 assets for 123 industries. It is
measured as the weighted average of industry‐level redeployability indexes across a firm's
business segments. In particular, the redeployability measure of a given industry j is calculated
as follows:






26Matsa (2018) also shows that financing labour is different than financing capital, due to labour market frictions.
Unlike capital, employees have the option to quit their jobs, which makes employers more sensitive to their needs.
Moreover, labour markets are characterized by potential unemployment costs and powerful labour unions that protect
employees against loss of pay and negotiate improved working conditions.
27Bloom (2009) provides evidence that LACs differ significantly from CACs. The author shows that the estimated CACs
arising from resale loss are 34% on capital, while the estimated LACs arising from hiring and firing decisions are rather
limited and represent 1.8% of annual wages. Similar statistics provided by Shapiro (1986) and Merz and Yashiv (2007)
also show that the quadratic adjustment costs of capital investment are relatively higher than the quadratic adjustment
costs of hiring/firing.
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where wj,a is industry j's expenditure on asset a divided by its total capital expenditures from
the BEA table and Redeployabilityscorea is the ratio of the number of industries that use given
asset a to the total number of industries in the BEA table (see Kim & Kung, 2017 for more
details). Because redeployable assets have high liquidation value, higher values in redeploy-
ability indexes indicate higher CACs.
The results presented in Table 9 (column (5)) show that product market competitive
pressure continues to significantly distort labour investment efficiency. More importantly, we
find that the coefficient on the interaction term FLUIDITY × LACs/CACs is positive and sta-
tistically significant, suggesting that the positive impact of competition on abnormal net hiring
becomes stronger for firms where the LAC‐to‐CAC ratio is higher and adjusting labour is
relatively more important than adjusting capital. This finding implies that the difference be-
tween labour investment and capital investment, particularly the difference in their costs of
adjustment, affects the relation between competition and labour investment efficiency. In sum,
these results confirm that the impact of competition is not homogeneous across all types of
investment and further highlight the importance of extending the literature on the link be-
tween competition, capital investment and labour investment.
7.3 | State‐level labour laws
As employment practices strongly depend on state‐level labour laws (Fairhurst et al., 2020), we
hypothesize that the documented relation between product market competition and labour
investment efficiency varies in the cross‐section due to such laws. To further explore this point,
we first take advantage of the enactment of state‐level right‐to‐work (RTW) laws, which
weaken unions’ bargaining power. RTW laws prohibit unions from mandating payment of
union fees by unionized workers and from compelling union membership as a condition of
employment. This allows a large number of non‐unionized employees to benefit from union
coverage without paying dues, hence reducing union resources and limiting their ability to
bargain collectively (Ellwood & Fine, 1987; Klasa et al., 2009). Accordingly, we expect RTW
laws, which are more business‐friendly, to decrease LACs for firms and to enhance efficiency in
labour investment decisions. These laws should weaken the relationship between product
market competition and labour investment inefficiency.
In addition, we exploit variation in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits across states and
over time. The UI system is common throughout the US in that all eligible unemployed
workers receive weekly benefit payments. However, there are substantial differences in the
amount and duration of these payments across states, as they are determined by worker
employment history. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) suggest that the generosity of UI benefits in
each state is measured through the maximum benefit amount and the maximum duration
allowed. The higher the generosity of UI benefits, the lower workers’ cost of unemployment.
These benefits make unemployment less costly for both workers and firms, as the former are
less likely to contest a dismissal decision and litigate against the latter. To the extent that UI
benefits lower the costs of labour adjustment for firms, we expect them to lessen the impact of
competitive pressure on labour investment inefficiency.28
28In this analysis, we do not examine the role of Wrongful Discharge Laws (WDLs) as all U.S. states adopted these laws




To test the role of labour‐related laws across states, we begin by identifying the historical
states of headquarters locations for all firms included in our sample, as Compustat reports only
the most recent data. We retrieve data on historical business headquarters from the Software
Repository for Accounting and Finance (SRAF) website of Bill McDonald.29,30 We next identify
the year in which each state enacted an RTW law based on Chava et al. (2020). We define RTW
as an indicator variable that equals 1 for all years after each firm's historical home state has
passed an RTW law and zero otherwise. We then collect information on UI benefits from the
U.S. Department of Labor's ‘Significant Provisions of State UI Laws’. We follow Agrawal and
TABLE 10 The role of labour laws
This table reports regression results on the impact of labour laws on the relation between product market
competition and labour investment efficiency. RTW is an indicator variable that equals one for all years after
each firm's historical home state has passed a Right‐To‐Work (RTW) law and zero otherwise. UI_Benefits is the
state‐level unemployment insurance benefits calculated as the product of the maximum benefit amount and the
maximum duration allowed. All reported absolute t values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. The list of variables definitions and data sources
is provided in Appendix A. *, ** and *** refer to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.














Year‐fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry‐fixed effects Yes Yes
State‐fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 17,481 11,960
Adjusted R² 0.163 0.135
29https://sraf.nd.edu/data/augmented-10-x-header-data/
30We drop from our sample observations with missing historical business headquarters locations.
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Matsa (2013) and measure the generosity of UI benefits (UI_Benefits) as the product of the
(weekly) maximum benefit amount and the maximum duration allowed at the state level.
The results reported in Table 10 show that abnormal investment in labour arising from
product market competition is heterogeneous and varies across states. In column (1), we find
that the coefficient on FLUIDITYt−1 × RTW is negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that the role of competition in increasing abnormal labour investment is less pronounced in
states with RTW laws. Similarly, in column (2), the coefficient on FLUIDITYt–1 × UI_Benefits is
negative and statistically significant, providing evidence that the positive impact of competition
on abnormal net hiring is weaker in states with more generous UI benefits. Overall, these
results are consistent with our conjecture that as RTW laws and UI benefits lower LACs, they
help mitigate labour investment distortions arising from competitive pressure.
8 | CONCLUSION
This paper examines the impact of product market competition on firm investment in em-
ployees, particularly the efficiency of labour investment decisions. On the basis of previous
theoretical and empirical research on the implications of product market competition, we
develop two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, consistent with the ‘bright side’ of
competition, we expect competitive pressure to be positively associated with labour investment
efficiency. Because competition acts as an external governance mechanism, it limits the di-
version of corporate resources and imposes discipline on the decision‐making process. This
mechanism likely pushes managers to make more efficient decisions that maximize share-
holder wealth, leading to improved labour investment efficiency. On the other hand, an op-
posing argument related to the ‘dark side’ of competition suggests a negative relation between
competitive pressure and labour investment efficiency. Product market competition may result
in underinvestment in labour because it exposes firms to higher bankruptcy risk, which leads
managers to forgo investments that could distort current performance, resulting in suboptimal
labour investment. Alternatively, competitive pressure may alter managerial incentives, en-
couraging management to improve the welfare of stakeholders, including employees, to boost
firm reputation and hence access to external capital. Moreover, product market competition
may induce myopic managers to protect their private benefits through collusion with em-
ployees. These incentive problems may result in overinvestment in labour.
Using a large sample of US firms over the period 1998–2017, we show that intense product
market competition is associated with lower labour investment efficiency; that is, higher de-
viation of labour investment from its optimal level justified by economic fundamentals. Via
additional analysis, we find that these results are observed mainly among underinvesting firms.
This finding is consistent with the ‘dark side’ view of competition, in particular, the risk‐
increasing effect of competition, which is likely to discourage manager investment incentives,
hence creating an underinvestment problem. Our results hold for a battery of robustness
checks. Specifically, our evidence persists after addressing endogeneity concerns, using alter-
native proxies for the dependent and independent variables, examining the role of other
nonlabour investments and controlling for the potential confounding effects of other firm‐ and
industry‐level characteristics. In cross‐sectional analysis, we also show that the negative impact
of competition on labour investment efficiency is stronger for firms with higher exposure to
competition, tighter financial constraints, greater information asymmetry and higher LACs,




This paper makes important contributions to the literature. Specifically, we extend the line
of research that examines the impact of competitive pressure on corporate decisions by focusing
on firm investment in human capital, a major factor of production hitherto underexplored in
previous research. This study also enhances the current understanding of the determinants of
labour investment decisions, by looking beyond firm‐level determinants and exploring product
market characteristics, specifically, product market competition. Finally, our findings hold
important policy implications for businesses and policymakers as they take decisions to im-
prove labour investment efficiency, especially in the face of significant labour market disrup-
tions due to increasing deglobalization, geopolitical disputes and global challenges.
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